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Abstract
As non-GAAP financial reports have proliferated in the last three decades, market participants have
begun to question the accuracy and credibility of non-GAAP information, particularly in the
context of equity valuation. On the one hand, companies’ managers claim that non-GAAP earnings
metrics have important value implication for investors as it can reduce ”accounting noises” and
reveal relevant insider information that might be neglected through standardized recording systems
like GAAP. On the other hand, market regulations and researchers are more critical towards non-
GAAP metrics, criticizing that non-GAAP exclusions are more than relevant and excluding them
will yield misleading and inaccurate information. This empirical study, therefore, firstly aims to
examine the development of non-GAAP financial metrics both in term of frequency of publication
and magnitude of non-GAAP exclusions. In the period from 2003 to 2015, the amount of non-
GAAP earnings reports has doubled and the gap between non-GAAP and GAAP metrics has
become larger, indicating managers have become more aggressive in their non-GAAP reporting.
Secondly, in attempt to identify the key drivers behind the difference between GAAP and non-
GAAP earnings metrics (non-GAAP exclusions), we find that special items are strongly correlated
to non-GAAP exclusions, suggesting that managers are more likely to exclude special items to
come to better earnings numbers. One interesting finding is that cost of goods sold and selling, and
general administration expenses also have strong links to non-GAAP exclusions. One possible
explanation is that as managers exhaust in choices of exclusions, they will resort to less obvious
options; that would be more likely to yield flawed and inaccurate financial information.
Keywords GAAP; non-GAAP; pro forma, non-GAAP adjustments, special items, exclusions
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41. Introduction
Since the 1990s, companies began providing non-GAAP financial measures, claiming that
GAAP financial measures do not adequately capture companies’ on-going core businesses,
hence not be adequate companies’ valuations. Non-GAAP financial measures are
commonly produced by making adjustments to the comparable GAAP measures. Since
there are no mutual and objective definitions of non-GAAP adjustments and no common
agreements on adjusting methods; and non-GAAP financial measures are not subjected to
auditing, companies have their own ways of reporting non-GAAP measures.
In the last three decades, we have seen a gradual increase in frequency of non-GAAP
earnings reporting. At the beginning of 1990s, there was only a handful of high-tech
companies that published their non-GAAP earnings metrics. In 2014, almost 71% of listed
firms on S&P published its non-GAAP earnings metrics (Black, 2017). There are some
possible explanations for the proliferation of non-GAAP earnings metrics. Firstly, as the
market becomes more complex, the demand for more accurate information of firm
performance naturally grew. In response the demand, firm managers publish their non-
GAAP earnings metrics as a complement to their standardized GAAP metrics, claiming
that non-GAAP earnings metrics better reflects companies’ core performances. Although
standardized GAAP measures are more comparable, it ignores many factors that are
relevant for companies’ core business. Secondly, market participants have become more
and more sensitive to companies’ earnings reports, especially after financial crisis in 2008.
Even a small drop in earnings might affect companies’ market values. This give managers
strong incentives to make their financial metrics look more favorable. Many prior studies
also suggest that managers opportunistically manipulate non-GAAP earnings numbers in
order to achieve a better earnings perception from market participants. At the same time, as
relationship between investors, analysts and corporation management have become more
complicated and interrelated, even a small negative earnings surprise can have a big effect
on companies’ stock prices. Firm managers, therefore, try to manipulate earnings number
to convey a more favorable picture of the firm to the market. Also, since the managers’
compensation structures have grown to be intertwined with companies’ performance, there
have been evidences that managers purposefully adopt earnings management or use non-
5GAAP reports to enhance performance perceptions, in order to guarantee better
compensations.
Prior researches suggest that not only the frequency of non-GAAP earning disclosures has
increased but also types of exclusions have become more complicated and the magnitude
of the exclusions have increased drastically over time. Since there is no definition of non-
GAAP earnings metrics, types of exclusion vary largely across firms. Although non-GAAP
reporting is supervised by SEC. There are simply no cast-iron frameworks on controlling
how managers adjust their non-GAAP earnings. The regulations on non-GAAP earnings
metrics, despite having been tightened up in recently years, are still limiting. Therefore,
companies are getting more creative with non-GAAP measure reporting and types of
adjustments evolved constantly. In response to the increase in amount of non-GAAP
reports and unregulated methods, SEC released regulation G in 2003 tightening up the
regulations around non-GAAP measures. The issuance of regulation G seems not having
been able to bring out long-term changes in non-GAAP reporting. For example, before
regulation G (2003), non-cash, transitory and non-recurring items are considered as most
common types of adjustments (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Doyle et al, 2003; Sloan and
Bradshaw, 2002). Particularly, expenses such as employee stock-based compensation,
goodwill amortization, merge and acquisition cost, restructuring cost are commonly
excluded. Companies’ managers claimed that these transitory items are more likely to add
noises to company’s core performances and excluding them would render a better picture
of companies’ financial performances, especially in the long run. After the regulation G
(2003), managers have adapted their methods of non-GAAP adjustments and are inclined
to use unexpected items or special items to manipulate earnings number (Kovel, 2008;
Doyle, 2013). At the same time, the gap between GAAP measures and their comparable
non-GAAP measures seems to grow gradually, showing that managers are getting more
and more aggressive in non-GAAP reporting.
While managers argue that by excluding these transitory and non-recurring expenses, non-
GAAP metrics is cleaner and more informative and better predict firms’ future profitability
(Brown and Sivakumar, 2003). Many researchers suggest these exclusions are far from
unimportant or irrelevant (Doyle, 2013). Non-GAAP earnings metrics are criticized to be
misleading, ad-hoc and incomplete. Despite all criticism about possible opportunistic
behaviors of managers in disclosing non-GAAP metrics, market participants still response
6positively to non-GAAP earnings metrics disclosures (Bhattacharya et al, 2007, Doyle,
2013). While some of the market participants, particularly non-professional investors are
likely to be more influenced by non-GAAP earning metrics, many skillful analysts are also
not able to fully understand non-GAAP exclusions and, thereby not able to properly
discount those earnings surprises. Some researchers suggest that even analysts and
professional investors rely largely on non-GAAP measures in their valuations.
The intensifying public criticism towards non-GAAP reporting is the main motivation of
this paper. Prior researches report that non-GAAP earnings disclosures have proliferated in
the last three decades. As the method of producing and disclosing non-GAAP earnings
metrics have become more complicated and opportunistic, we’d like to see whether the
magnitudes as well as the type of non-GAAP exclusions have increased and varied during
the period from 2003 to 2016. Also, as regulators have constantly issued warnings and
additional regulations to restrict the misleading disclosures and opportunistic usage of non-
GAAP earnings numbers, we would like to see whether additional regulations, particularly
the implementation of Reg G have achieved its purpose of reducing opportunistic
behaviors of managers. Another motivation for this paper is the availability of the first
large-sample data set of managers’ non-GAAP earnings metrics collected by Bentley et al.
(2018). As non-GAAP earnings metrics disclosures are not compulsory, there is no
systematic and sorted database of managers’ non-GAAP numbers available for the public.
There have been some attempts to hand-collect sample of managers’ non-GAAP earnings
such as researches by Bhattacharya et. al (2003), Marques (2006), Black et. al. (2017), etc.
These samples are, however, very limiting, for example, small in size as well as short in
time span. Alternatively, researchers frequently use analyst forecast data I/B/E/S as a proxy
for managers’ non-GAAP metrics. As analyst forecast data are produced based on
companies’ performances given by managers, analyst forecast data I/B/E/S can reflect
largely managers’ messages on companies’ core performance. Despite being popular, the
usage of analysts’ I/B/E/S data are often questioned by researchers as it ignores the
aggressiveness of managers’ reporting choices. On the other hand, although managers can
influence analysts’ forecast indirectly, analysts are still capable of making independent
decisions whether or not to take into account managers’ information. The main reason for
researchers to use I/B/E/S data as proxy for pro-forma financial metrics is due to lack of
data on managers’ non-GAAP numbers. Therefore, by using sample provided in Bently’s
7research (2018), we expect to be able to provide a better analysis on managers’ non-GAAP
earnings metrics.
The first purpose of this paper is to examine the trend in reporting of non-GAAP earnings
metrics over the period from 2003 to 2016 in term of frequency and magnitude. We
examine the total amount of non_GAAP reports as well as the mean value of Earning Per
Share (EPS) from both GAAP and non_GAAP reports in order to give a overall picture on
development trend of non_GAAP reporting. Firstly, we find that the publishing of
non_GAAP reporting have become popular and companies have been released their
non_GAAP earnings metrics more frequently since 2003 until 2016. Although market
experienced a small drop in the amount of non_GAAP reports in 2003 when the regulation
G was issued, the effect of regulation G quickly deteriorated. As the market are in need for
more information and more sensitive to earnings numbers, more and more companies have
adopted the non_GAAP reporting practices, making the amount of non_GAAP almost
doubled in over 10 years. Secondly, we find that the level of non_GAAP earnings numbers
has always been higher than GAAP earning numbers. Although development of the value
of non_GAAP_EPS over time follows to the large extent the development pattern of
GAAP_EPS values from period of 2003 to 2016, the gap between non_GAAP _EPS and
non_GAAP_EPS values grew, especially after the financial crisis in 2008. After the crisis,
the difference (or exclusions) doubled and remained at higher level until 2016. The level of
GAAP_EPS dropped drastically but level of non_GAAP_EPS remains relatively at the
same level. This partly shows that managers are more aggressive in excluding earnings
components in order to create better non_GAAP financial metrics, especially during crisis
period.
The second purpose of this paper is to identify the main potential drivers behind the
differences (Exclusions) between the GAAP and non_GAAP metrics. By investigating
correlation between the exclusions and line items in income statement, we expect to find
out what expenses are likely to be related to non-GAAP exclusions. The result indicates
that the among the expense items in income statement, Cost of Goods Sold is the largest
cost, followed by Selling, General and Administrative expenses, and others. On the other
hand, Special items is smallest expense. However, special items, have the strongest link
with non-GAAP exclusions. As special items are non-recurring item, it agrees with
8previous literature that managers are likely to exclude non_recurring items in their non-
GAAP reporting.
With these main purposes, this paper is divided in to three following sections. We will
continue with literature review section where we review previous researches on
development of non-GAAP earnings reporting, earnings quality and earnings management,
common non-GAAP adjustments, the issuance of regulation G and its influence on non-
GAAP reporting as well as our hypothesis development. In the research design section, we
will discuss the sample choice, variables selection and regression model. In empirical
result section, we discuss the trend in non-GAAP development in term of both quantity and
quality, also the relation between income statement’s line items and non-GAAP
adjustments. Finally, in conclusion, we will summary our findings, discuss limitations,
application of this study, as well as suggestions for further studies.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
2.1. Non-GAAP earnings metrics
Non-GAAP earnings numbers, commonly used in stock valuations, are customized metrics
from earnings results produced according to GAAP standards. After companies’ GAAP
earnings numbers are produced, managers often modify these numbers by excluding some
supposedly unimportant items or expenses to product non-GAAP earnings metrics which
are claimed by managers to be a better indicator of companies’ core business and a better
predictor for future performance. These non-GAAP metrics are released along with
earnings announcements and are used mostly by various market participants for company
valuations. There are some different terms for non-GAAP earnings metrics, namely “pro
forma earnings” “street earnings”, “operating earnings”, etc. Among the companies that
published pro forma earnings, 49.9% are firms in the service industry (advertising service,
technology-related service, and other professional services) and 30.7% are from the
manufacturing industry (food, chemicals, paper, machinery, electronics and transportation,
etc.) (Lougee and Marquardt, 2004). Moreover, those firms with non-GAAP earnings are
generally younger (Bhattacharya and Black, 2004).
9There are two different types of non-GAAP earnings metrics, one produced by companies
themselves and the other by analysts. Often the analysts’ non-GAAP earnings metrics, in
the other words, I/B/E/S metrics are used as proxy for managers’ non-GAAP earnings
metrics, especially in stock valuation. As publishing non-GAAP earnings is not
compulsory, there is no consistent and systematic data collection of non-GAAP earnings
available to the public. There have been few attempts at hand-collecting pro-forma metrics,
they are, however smaller size sample and limited to some certain report settings or certain
industries (Bradshaw, 2011; Bhattacharya, 2004; Easton, 2003; etc.). Hand-collecting this
data set is time-consuming and quite often the sample size and characteristics are
statistically limiting and irrelevant for further researches in different contexts. Therefore,
researchers have been using I/B/E/S data as proxy for managers’ non-GAAP metrics, being
aware of the tradeoffs. For instance, I/B/E/S earning numbers are said to not be able to
accurately identify managers’ motivation and aggressiveness in non-GAAP reporting.
Generally speaking, analysts’ non-GAAP numbers agree largely with managers’ non-
GAAP metrics, sometimes analysts do disregard managers’ exclusions, resulting in I/B/E/S
numbers being different from managers’ earnings numbers (Bently et al., 2018).
Using analyst’s non-GAAP metrics as proxy for managers’ non-GAAP metrics has been
criticized as inappropriate and insufficient (Bhattacharya, 2003). Managers’ and analysts’
non-GAAP metrics are not only different in nature, attributes but also the motives behind
their disclosures. Often, before managers disclose company’s non-GAAP metrics earnings
in its earnings announcement, there are press releases informing market participants about
potential exclusions (Gu and Chen, 2004). When the managers’ non-GAAP metrics are
released, analysts’ will decide to adjust their EPS earnings or not. Hence, managers do
have power to influence analysts’ estimates to a certain extent (Doyle, 2013) even though
analysts and managers often claim that their non-GAAP metrics are independent from each
other. Therefore, managers’ non-GAAP metrics can be somewhat reflected in analysts’
non-GAAP metrics. On the other hand, analysts can decide to totally ignore managers’
non-GAAP calculations and exclude items that they see fit in their estimations. Analysts’
non-GAAP metrics, hence, also might not be accurate proxy for managers’ non-GAAP
metrics (Bentley, 2018). In this paper, we will directly use managers’ non-GAAP metrics
due to the availability of data. Non-GAAP earning metrics, in this paper, means managers’
non-GAAP metrics.
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There are two contradicting views on why managers disclose non-GAAP metrics.
Managers want either to improve performance perception or to better communicate with
investors about their performance (Heflin, 2008). When the market and firm management
have become more and more independent on each other, market participants can react
aggressively to even very small negative earnings surprises. This gives managers’
incentives to avoid negative surprise by using non-GAAP earnings metrics (Kasznik and
Lev, 1995; Matsumoto, 2000). Also, managers can manipulate earnings by leaving out
certain expense items in order to meet analysts’ forecasts, signaling a positive picture of
performance to market participants (Bhattacharya, 2001; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004;
Doyle and Soliman, 2005). Bowen et al, (2005) found evidences that managers
purposefully emphasize non-GAAP earnings in its earnings announcement. Also,
managers proactively try to define and influence managers’ view influences (Sloan and
Bradshaw, 2001). On the other hand, there have been evidences, suggesting that managers
altruistically want to better communicate with market participants about firm core
performance which GAAP metrics fail to convey (Bhattacharya et al., 2007; and Doyle,
2013).
2.2. Development of non-GAAP earnings reporting
The rise in the popularity of non-GAAP earning metrics seems was triggered from early
1990s starting out from service and high-tech industries. (Bhattacharya, 2003 and Sender,
2002). Anecdotally, non-GAAP earning metrics was originally firm managers’ idea
because they want to actively provide market participants with earnings information that
better reflects companies’ performance. However, there have been also claims that firm
managers by producing non-GAAP metrics are just simply responding to market pressure
for more accurate earnings information (Sloan and Bradshaw, 2002). Dichev and Tang
(2008) found another potential explanation for the proliferation of non-GAAP reporting.
When the market becomes more complex and volatile, GAAP recording system became
obsolete and failed to reflect the real firm’s performance, making it less useful for firm
valuations (Dichev and Tang, 2008 and Dichev et al, 2013). Regardless of the origin or the
original motives, reporting of non-GAAP by firm managers gradually increased and the
use of non-GAAP metrics by market participants spread out to all industries. The amount
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of non-GAAP metrics release was 181 in 1998 and 695 in 2000 and the numbers of
adjustment have arisen by 1100 units in the period from 1998 to 2000. (Bhattacharya,
2003). Over the last 20 years, not only the frequency of non-GAAP earnings metrics but
also the differences between GAAP and non-GAAP metrics have increased drastically; and
certain types of exclusions have become more common. Bentley, Christensen, Gee and
Whipple (2018), reported that a non-GAAP EPS metric was available for approximately
60% of all firms in 2013, while Black, Christensen, Ciesielski, and Whipple (2018) found
that 71% of firms in the S&P500 disclosed non-GAAP earnings in 2014.
2.3. Common types of exclusion in non-GAAP earnings metric disclosures
Since there is no objective definition for non-GAAP earnings metrics, managers can adjust
pro forma earnings figures in numerous ways. For example, non-GAAP exclusions can
occur at different levels, from income statement level (Restructuring cost) to gross profit
level (Store-specific profit). With regards to time, some exclusions such as estimated cost
for restructuring are related to future performance estimation but they can also associate
with already-occurred expenses like write-downs. Also, some exclusions are non-
discretionary, and some are discretionary accruals (Goodwill amortization versus asset
impairment) (Doyle, 2003). Therefore, managers’ non-GAAP earnings numbers are often
not comparable among firms. There are, however, a common observation found from
literatures that pro forma earnings are almost always higher than GAAP earnings numbers
(Bhattacharya et al, 2003; Brown and Sivakumar, 2003; Black and Christensen, 2009),
resulting in the fact that pro forma numbers meet or beat analysts’ forecasts more often
than GAAP earnings figures (Bhattacharya at al., 2003). Also, Doyle (2003) observed in
his research that all of decisions regarding exclusions were always deliberately made by
managers. This raises the question on the quality of managers’ non-GAAP earnings figures
whether they can mislead market participants.
Although the types of adjustments which managers make to their non-GAAP earnings
numbers vary across firms, non-cash and non-recurring items are the most common types
of pro forma adjustments (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Doyle et al., 2003; Sloan and
Bradshaw, 2002). More specifically, employee stock-based compensation, goodwill
amortization, restructuring costs, write-downs and impairment, merge and acquisition cost,
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research and development expenditures are among the most common items to be excluded.
(Sloan and Bradshaw, 2001). Managers often claim that by removing these irrelevant and
unimportant items, non-GAAP earnings numbers reflect better companies’ core
performance and are better predictor of future cash flow; thereby will give out more
accurate valuations. Halsey and Soybel (200) concurred that removal of non-cash and non-
recurring items “enhances comparability in time-series measures” and “items such as
restructuring charges and gains and losses on the sales of assets have little implication for
future earnings”. On the contrary, many practitioners, researchers and regulators find these
items far from unimportant and excluding them will lead to incomplete and misleading
earnings measures. Doyle et al, (2003) investigated the informational properties of pro
forma earnings and found that higher level of exclusions in non-cash and non-recurring
items will lead to predictably higher stock valuation. For example, in AT&T cases (2001),
per share price increase from -39 cents on GAAP basis to 5 cents after the exclusions of
restructuring and other non-recurring charges (Doyle at al., 2003).
As mentioned, there are no general definitions on non-GAAP exclusions, types of
adjustments vary largely across industries as well as companies. However, researchers
have observed several trends when it comes to managers’ choice of adjustments. First of
almost all of adjustments are made from expenses that decrease companies’ income,
meaning that, most non-GAAP adjustments have an income-increasing effects (Doyle,
2003; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Bradshaw and Sloan, 2003; etc.). This often raises doubt
among researchers and market participants about managers’ opportunistic behaviors in
non-GAAP reporting. Secondly, there are several common expenses and charges that are
used in producing non-GAAP earning metrics. For example, depreciation and amortization
expenses is one of the most common items used in the period from 1998 to 2002
(Bhattacharya, 2002). Restructuring charges (merger and acquisition costs), goodwill
amortization, write-downs and impairments and stock-based charges are among the most
common exclusions. For instance, Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) observed that companies
excluded items like payroll taxes on stock options, stock rights, deferred compensations,
etc. In their study, Bradshaw and Sloan (2003) measured the magnitude and frequency of
these common exclusions and find that both magnitude as well as frequency increased
drastically.
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Special items and other exclusions
According to Doyle (2003), managers’ exclusions often fall into two categories: Special
items and other exclusions. “Special items: Unusual or nonrecurring items presented above
taxes” (Compustat, 2019). Some common special items include write-downs, gains, and
losses, restructuring costs. There are, however, some special items that are vaguer. Some
examples of other exclusions are amortization of goodwill, operation losses, stock
compensation expense, in-process R&D charges, legal settlement costs (Doyle, 2003)
These two common types of exclusions are different not only in characteristics but also
have different predictive properties (Doyle, 2003). According to Doyle’s study in 2003,
exclusions in special items have little predictive value for future performance. They are,
therefore, high-quality exclusions, meaning that exclusions of this items have little
negative effect on the quality of non-GAAP figures. On the other hand, other exclusions
are highly correlated to firms’ future performance. More specifically, other exclusions
have high predictability power of negative future cash flow.
“A dollar of other exclusions in a quarter predicts 6.422 fewer dollars of
future cash from operations over the next three years, almost as predictive as
the pro forma earnings number itself” (Doyle, 2003)
In response to all the observations of impact of non-GAAP exclusions on valuation, reg G
requires managers to make the exclusion of recurring expense more obvious to investors in
order to increase the quality of other exclusions (Kolev, 2008). The assumed consequence
of this requirement is that managers would reduce the recurring item exclusions in non-
GAAP earnings, resulting in better quality in other exclusions. This should not affect the
quality of special items, thereby generally increase the overall quality of non-GAAP
earnings number. However, after the release of reg G, there are evidences of managers
misusing special items by shifting more recurring items into special items. So instead of
adjusting other exclusions, we see more of non-GAAP exclusions in special items (Kolev,
2008). For example, recurring expenses can be assigned as “transitory” special items in
their financial statement (McVay 2006). Or they can label them as non-recurring items in
press release (Doyle, et al., 2003). Since the classification of expenses in special items are
very subjective. For instance, IT expenditures can be allocated as Y2K expenses or
expenses of store closures can be classified as restructuring cost. This, naturally, results in
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a decrease in quality of special items in its predictive value of firm future performance. It
is, however, difficult to say whether this trend was triggered by the regulation intervention
on non-GAAP disclosures and managers have found a new methods to opportunistically
manipulate the financial results; or it was just a natural response to current economic
situations of the firms and market.
2.4. Non-GAAP financial measures and earnings quality
2.4.1. Conceptual framework for earnings quality
Managers often claims that non-GAAP financial measures are more informative, persistent
and are a better tool set for predicting future performance. In other words, non-GAAP
financial metrics have better earnings quality than standardized GAAP financial results.
In accounting literature, there are various ways of defining and measuring earnings quality
of reported income, we use in this thesis the concept and measurement methodology
defined in Dechow’s article (2010). In the article, proxies for earning quality are organized
into three categories: Properties of earnings, Investor responsiveness to earnings and
External indicators of earning misstatements (Dechow, 2010). In the scope of this thesis,
we focus mostly on two proxies (Properties of earnings and Investor responsiveness) to
discuss the quality of non-GAAP earnings quality due to lack of availability of information
on external indicators of earning misstatement.
Properties of earnings
Properties of earnings refers to five earnings characteristics: Earnings persistence,
Abnormal accruals and modeling the accrual process, Earnings smoothness, Asymmetric
timeliness and timely loss recognition, and Target beating.
 Earning persistence
The more persistent a company’s earnings are, the higher quality of their earnings number.
Firms with more persistent earnings have more persistent cashflow, thereby making it
better input for discounted cash flow- based valuation. However, the persistency can be
originated from both the firm’s fundamental performance and the accounting methods in
practice. In the other words, even if a company’s earnings are very persistent, it is difficult
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to tell whether the firms’ fundamental performance is really persistent or there might be
earning management involved.
Magnitude of accruals
Extreme accruals are considered low quality because they can be interpreted as less
persistence in earnings flow. However, this proxy has the similar disadvantage to earnings
persistence since the fundamental performance and measurement methods are entangled. It
is difficult to distinguish whether the company’s poor performance or the accounting
method is responsible for the extreme accruals.
   Smoothness
Smoothness of earnings are calculated as ratio of earnings and cash flow. The lower the
ratio is, the more smoothly earnings move into firm relatively to cash flows. Earnings
smoothing is a common accounting practice which helps to bring persistence and
informativeness to earnings numbers. Again, the smoothness of earnings can come from
company’s earnings flow, reporting method or managers’ active involvement in earnings
manipulation.
Benchmarking/ Target beating
Unusual twists in earnings distribution indicates possible earnings manipulation. Unusual
twists can be sudden positive earnings increases, changes in forecast error, beat and meat
the target after accounting adjustments, etc. This proxy is easy to measure but it is difficult
to tell whether earnings twists are caused by chance, or managers’ earnings management
behaviors.
Residuals from accrual models
The main goal of these models is to find correlation between accruals and management
discretion or estimation errors. Unlikely the other proxies, these accrual models can isolate
the drive behind extreme accruals, separating errors caused by accounting method and
management manipulation behaviors. It is assumed that the more residuals from accrual
models, the lower the quality of earnings is.
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 Timely loss recognition (TLR)
Timely loss recognition refers to the recognition of losses in earnings in a timely manner.
Hence, the higher the TLR is, the higher the earnings quality is. The use of TLR as a proxy
for earnings quality can help to distinguish the opportunistic behaviors and the
measurement methods.
Investors responsiveness to earnings
The fundamental assumption is that the market is efficient, and investors rationally respond
to the information that has value implication. Hence, the higher the correlation with value
implies, the better earnings quality is.
2.4.2. Evidence on earnings quality of non-GAAP financial metrics
In the last ten years, the gap between GAAP and non-GAAP financial metrics has
increased drastically that raises concerns about the earnings quality of non-GAAP financial
metrics. Also, according to Bently et al. (2018), a sudden increase in the number of non-
GAAP reports since 2000, right in the beginning of the technology bubble, indicates that
there might be earnings management involved. Managers might try to use non-GAAP
financial metrics to manipulate earnings to render a better perception of companies’ value,
especially during crisis period.
Investor responsiveness to earnings: high quality
First of all, one of the common observations is that non-GAAP earnings are often highly
correlated to abnormal stock returns. Secondly, the average P/E ratio of companies that
publish non-GAAP earnings, is significantly higher than industry’s average (Bhattacharya,
2003). This can be interpreted that investors response positively to pro forma figures.
Similar evidences are found from various researches. Although the mean revenue of non-
GAAP firms is below the average revenue of companies in the same industry, their stock
prices are often higher than market average (Bently et. al (2018), Bhattacharya (2003), and
Doyle (2001)). This means that investors perceive non-GAAP earnings to have value
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implication and be relevant in equity valuation. Hence in the context of investors’
responsiveness, non-GAAP earnings quality is considered quite high. Many studies further
explain that non-GAAP earnings are more informative to investors when GAAP earnings
are more subjective (Loungee and Marquardt, 2004; Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002). However,
the big disadvantage of this proxy is that its difficult to say whether or not
investors/analysts are fully able to separate earning management activities versus
companies’ fundamental operating performance.
Benchmarking/ Target beating: low quality
According to Bhattacharya’s report (2003), 80% of non-GAAP reporting companies beat
the analysts’ forecast. However, while comparing these exact companies’ GAAP metrics,
only 39% of them beat analysts’ forecasts. Also 66% of non-GAAP companies make
profit, but only 52% of GAAP companies report a profit. Doyle (2013) findings also state
similar phenomena. Firms use non-GAAP earnings that are higher than GAAP earnings are
more likely to meet or beat the analysts’ forecasts. More specifically, 14% of firms that
have positive exclusions beat and met the forecasts (Doyle, 2013
Accruals: No significant different
Non-GAAP companies’ accruals do not significantly differ from average accruals of other
companies in the same industry (Bhattacharya, 2002)
Earning persistence: higher quality than average
For example, managers acting to ‘‘inform’’ will remove income-decreasing transitory
items when calculating non-GAAP earnings because excluding the item results in non-
GAAP earnings that are more persistent than GAAP earnings. However, managers acting
opportunistically will also exclude income-decreasing transitory items when calculating
non-GAAP earnings because excluding the item results in non-GAAP earnings that exceed
GAAP earnings. It is difficult to disentangle evidences of the information and opportunism
hypotheses as both hypotheses predict the same disclosure treatment for income-decreasing
transitory items (Curtis, 2014).
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Comparability and Consistency: Low quality
We also include the characteristic comparability and consistence in order to have more
extensive picture of non-GAAP earnings quality. Since there is no standards and mutual
agreements on definition of non-GAAP earnings reports, non-GAAP earnings reports are
often not comparable across firms. Furthermore, not only incomparable across firms, types
of adjustment vary largely and very challenging to classify non-GAAP adjustments into
specific groups. For example, in Bhattacharya’s study (2004), after researcher arranges
sample of 1989 adjustments into 11 different categories, there are still 13% of the
adjustments classified as others which do not belong to any specific categories. Since the
exclusions deem to be non-transitory or nonrecurring, companies are less likely to make
identical adjustments for two or more consecutive years. Only 10% of companies made
similar adjustment with the same definitions in their non-GAAP report in two consecutive
years and 68% used totally different definition and made different adjustments every time
(Bhattacharya, 2004). Companies are not consistent in publishing non-GAAP financial
metrics every year that makes non-GAAP earnings quality very low in term of consistency.
As the non-GAAP financial metrics are influent, the time series comparison becomes less
accurate and relevant.
Other observations on earnings quality of non-GAAP financial metrics
Researchers find that companies that publish non-GAAP earnings are more liquid and have
more debt than the industry average.  Non-GAAP firms are more likely to be less
profitable and they have higher Research and Development expenses than the industry
average (Bhattacharya, 2004).
Another common statement regarding the earnings quality of non-GAAP metrics is that
non-GAAP earning metrics are better predictor of companies’ future performance, thereby
be more relevant in the context of equity evaluation (Brown and Sivakumar, 2003). On the
other hand, Lougee and Marquardt (2002) find no significant difference between non-
GAAP and GAAP earnings in term of predictive ability. However, the non-GAAP
earnings’ predictive ability of future cash flow increases, particularly when the GAAP
earnings’ predictive ability is low (Lougee and Marquardt, 2002).
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2.5. Market responses to non-GAAP earnings disclosures
Despite negative criticisms towards the creditability of non-GAAP metrics, market
participants still perceive these metrics as informative and put significantly higher weight
on non-GAAP earnings metrics than on GAAP operating earnings (Sloan and Bradshaw,
2002; Bhattacharya et al, 2007).
On the contrary, some researchers find no difference in market participants’ reaction to
non-GAAP earnings metrics or GAAP earnings metrics (Johnson and Schwartz, 2001;
Lougee and Marquardt, 2002). On the other hand, Doyle (2003) suggests that market does
respond to non-GAAP earnings metrics. They are, however, “fooled by firms’ use of pro
forma earnings (Doyle, 2003). Doyle went further and explained that although market
participants do discount earnings surprises by 10% to 14% when the exclusions are
associated with non-GAAP increasing profit; they are not fully able to understand and
estimate the predictive power of the excluded items (Gu and Chen, 2003; Goyle 2013).
There are clearly contradicting evidences on the capability of investors of properly
discount non-GAAP earnings numbers. For instance, Bhattacharya (2003) finds evidence
that analysts express skepticism when non-GAAP exclusions transform a loss into a profit,
but they do not necessarily discount the non-GAAP exclusions in their valuation models.
Similarly, non-GAAP exclusions that help companies to meet or beat the analysts’
forecasts are weighted more lightly in investors’ valuation (Bhattacharya, 2003). This
suggests that market participants including investors and analysts partially perceive
opportunistic behaviors but do not fully comprehend the complexity of non-GAAP
exclusions.
Furthermore, less sophisticated market participants are more likely to be misled by non-
GAAP earnings metrics (Frederickson 2004; Bhattacharya et al., 2007; and Doyle, 2013).
In his research, Frederickson (2004) finds that MBA students (as representatives of less
sophisticated investors) place 12% higher in stock valuation when they are exposed to
income- increasing non-GAAP earnings numbers. Similarly, non-GAAP earnings metrics
seem not affect experienced analysts’ judgment on stock valuation and they are also
inclined to postpone their buy-sell decisions longer than less sophisticated investors after
earning announcements. Frederickson (2004) explains further that since analysts use
complicated valuation models to evaluate equity value, it helps to reduce bias and
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misjudgment concerning non-GAAP earnings. Meanwhile, other less sophisticated
investors have no access to such complex models and technology. Their evaluations are
more dependent on feelings, simple and intuitive valuation models where non-GAAP
earnings have much bigger impact on the valuation.
Other way to examine market response to non-GAAP earnings is market premium that
investors give to non-GAAP reporting companies. Johnson and Schwartz (2003) compare
firms that disclose pro forma earnings to firms that do not and find that the former trade at
higher multiples. However, they conclude that the market premium for pro forma
disclosers is not due to these firms disclosing pro forma earnings, but rather due to
underlying firm characteristics that are fundamentally different from firms that do not
disclose pro forma earnings.
2.6. Criticism on non-GAAP earnings metrics
There seems to be two opposite viewpoints on the creditability and informativeness of non-
GAAP earnings metrics. On one side, managers claim that non-GAAP metrics are more
informative because by removing non-recurring and non-cash charges, non-GAAP
earnings metrics reflect more accurately companies’ core business (Weil, 2001; and Bray,
2001). There are various intensives for opportunistic behaviors of managers but on the
other hands, managers do have insiders’ information on companies’ performance and
financial health (Barnea, Ronen and Sadan (1975); Healy and Wahlen (1999)). Despite of
many incentives for opportunistic behaviors, the most prevalent motivation for non-GAAP
reporting is to better inform market participants of companies’ performance (Curtis, 2014)
According to Bhattacharya et al. (2003) non-GAAP earnings numbers are “more
permanent measure of firm profitability than GAAP operating earnings”. Brown and
Sivakumar (2003) suggest that I/B/E/S EPS numbers are cleaner and have better quality
than EPS before extraordinary item from Compustat, thereby have better informative and
predictive property. Also, many analysts consider pro forma earnings as a more
representative measurement of “core earnings” than GAAP earnings (Bhattacharya et al.,
2003).  One of the common explanations for the existence of non-GAAP earnings metrics
is that firms simply respond to the increasing market demand for accurate information on
company core performance. Market participants are free to decide whether to take these
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measures into their consideration (Alpert, 2001 and Weil, 2001). Similarly, SEC chairman
Harvey Pitt (2001) state that the popularity of non-GAAP earnings metrics is just evidence
of lack and inaccuracy of financial information and of limitations of general accounting
standards like GAAP. Hence, non-GAAP report is a complementary financial set that
overcome the limitations of GAAP reporting system. Analysts themselves also claim that
they are competent and capable of judging the credibility and reliability of these non-
GAAP earning numbers. For example, when non-GAAP earnings numbers report a profit
or beat the analysts’ forecasts while the corresponding GAAP earnings numbers don’t,
investors and analysts are inclined to be more skeptical and more careful on weighting
these non-GAAP numbers in their valuation (Bhattacharya et al., 2003). All in all, clear
enthusiasm towards non-GAAP financial reporting is more commonly found among
companies’ managers, investors, and analysts.
On the other hand, scholars and market regulators seem to have a more critical view on
“pro-forma” earnings and urge for stricter regulations on non-GAAP earnings disclosures
to protect market participants. A large portion of literature provide evidence on the
misleading attribute of non-GAAP earnings metrics and firm managers’ opportunistic
behaviors. Critics claim that non-GAAP metrics are misleading, ad-hoc and not
comparable across firms or time span (Weil, 2001; Derby, 2001; Grant and Parker, 2001).
Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) claim in their study that managers have tendency to highlight
non-GAAP earnings in their earnings announcement without properly comparing them
with corresponding GAAP earnings metrics or stating explanations for certain exclusions.
This can be interpreted as managers’ effort to purposefully frame investors’ perception of
companies’ fundamental performance. Managers also make different exclusions each time
in order to reduce the comparability of earning figures (Grant and Parker, 2001). Most of
the adjustments made are either to exclude expense or to include transitory gains, which
both helps to increase profit and to meet the earnings forecasts (Curtis, 2014). These
characteristics of exclusions highly indicate opportunistic behaviors of managers. Many
investors and regulators directly criticized non-GAAP earnings metrics as “dangerously
flawed” (Byrnes and Derhovanesian, 2002). According to the U.S Treasury (2002),
although earnings numbers produced according to GAAP might me inefficient and
sometimes fail to reflect fully the companies’ operation, usage of non-GAAP earnings
metrics does not add more values but rather create distorted perception of earnings.
Furthermore, using of non-GAAP earnings will deteriorate the ability of regulators to
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enforce GAAP standards (Bhattacharya, 2007). In short, non-GAAP earnings reporting
encounters extreme critics that it is not only irrelevant but totally flawed and should be
ignored. They do not possess any value-added characteristics in the context of equity
valuation.
There have been plenty of concrete examples where managers manipulated non-GAAP
earnings metrics to create a more favorable picture of firm performance. In 2001, JDS
Uniphase, a manufacturer of optical products, highlighted its $67 million profit (on non-
GAAP basis) while purposefully hiding its GAAP earnings of $50.6 billion loss and details
on reconciliation of adjustment made in its earnings announcement (Dow Jones 2001).
Similarly, in 1999, Trump hotel & casino resort Inc. included a special gain and excluded a
special loss in its non-GAAP earnings without disclosing details on the adjustments (SEC,
2002). Moreover, in opposition to analysts’ claims, Doyle (2003) argued that investors and
analysts pay too much attention to non-GAAP earning metrics and less sophisticated
investors and analysts fail not only to see through managers opportunistic behaviors but
also to understand the effect and implication of non-GAAP exclusions on predictability of
firm future performance. Market regulator, Securities and Exchange commission (SEC),
had expressed concerns on non-GAAP earnings metrics and many times issued warnings to
firms that opportunistically use non-GAAP disclosures. For examples, in 2001, SEC
issued: “We believe it is appropriate to caution public companies on their use of pro forma
financial information and to alert investors to potential dangers of such financial numbers”
(SEC, 2001). And Lynn Turner, former chief accountant of SEC publicly criticized pro
forma earning metrics as “everything but bad stuff” (Dow Jones, 2001).
Regulation G
As non-GAAP earnings disclosures grasped more negative attention from regulators, SEC
decided to intervene. In December 2001, SEC officially issued a cautionary warning on the
non-GAAP earnings disclosures alleging that despite adding incremental value to GAAP
earnings information, pro forma earnings metrics are incomplete and can be ad hoc and
misleading. In addition, a new disclosure regulation, regulation G, was officially issued on
28 March 2003.
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The reg G requires that:
(a) disclose the most directly comparable GAAP earnings number,
(b) disclose the reconciliation of the non-GAAP numbers to the GAAP numbers
(c) furnish within 5 days, a form 8-K containing an explanation of why
management believes the non-GAAP number is useful for investors.
(Source: Heflin, 2008)
Companies that publish non-GAAP financial metrics are required to identify the “most
directly comparable” GAAP measures. Furthermore, companies must provide a
reconciliation of the gap between non-GAAP and GAAP numbers and justifications for the
exclusions made. These requirements are assumed to enhance the transparency in
communication between companies’ managers and market participants. Additionally,
companies are prohibited to exclude non-recurring and non-transitory expenses in non-
GAAP earnings reports if these items are reported in the previous two years and are likely
to appear within two years (Regulation S-K/ Item 10 and Regulation S-B/ Item 10). Also,
non-GAAP earnings metrics are not allowed to be published on companies’ normal
financial reports that are prepared according to standard GAAP or in financial notes (SEC,
2002). Companies are also required submit a Form 8_K filling to SEC and are encouraged
to disclose additional information on non-GAAP earnings that managers think that would
be beneficial, relevant and informative for users of non-GAAP earnings report (SEC, 2002)
After the warning in 2001 and regulation 2003, there was a significant decline in non-
GAAP financial measure disclosures, particularly in 2003. (Heflin and Hsu, 2005; Black,
2018). The decrease was, however, temporary (Brown, Christensen, Elliott and
Mergenthaler, 2008) and the frequency of non-GAAP disclosures rebounded in 2004 and
has gradually increase since then (Black, 2018). More specifically, approximately 60% of
firms report non-GAAP earnings metrics in 2013 (Bentley, 2018) and 71% in 2014 (Black,
2018). Heflin and Hsu (2005) also found evidence that non-GAAP earnings are less likely
to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, suggesting that stricter regulation might have prevented
managers from opportunistic behaviors.
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In term of market response, after reg G, market participants still react positively to non-
GAAP earnings metrics and often market participants perceive non-GAAP adjustments to
be transitory (Marques, 2006; Black, 2018). In general, the quality of exclusion after reg G
has increased meaning that they are transitory and non-recurring (Kovel, 2008). Also, there
was decline in exclusion magnitude immediately after the reg G (Heflin, 2008). Managers
are more cautious and less likely to adjust earnings metrics to meet strategic targets (Heflin
and Hsu, 2005; Black, 2017). On the other hand, Kovel (2008) finds that an obvious
deterioration in quality of special items and other items, suggesting that firms managers
adjust to the new rules and are shifting into special items. Doyle’s research (2013) support
Kovel’s findings, stating that after reg G managers opportunistically use other unexpected
items and special items to manipulate earnings so that analyst forecasts are met.
Particularly, managers are more likely to exclude stock-compensation, interest, and tax to
meet strategic targets (Black, 2017). Seemingly, regulation G had had a temporary impact
on aggressive non-GAAP reporting. The effect, however, deteriorated and non-GAAP
firms continue to find different ways to exclude non-transitory and recurring items (Black,
2017) in order to create favorable picture of firm’s performance. As consequence, SEC
issued a Compliance and Disclosure interpretation on non-GAAP financial measures in
January 2010 to impose a stricter supervision on the non-GAAP disclosures.
Unlike the intense criticism towards non-GAAP earnings report inside the U.S, outside the
U.S market, participants are more accepting of non-GAAP earnings metrics. There are not
many regulations in term of how, when and what non-GAAP exclusions are reported. For
instance, in IFRS companies can directly add non-IFRS financial metrics along with their
IFRS reports if companies provide reconciliations and explanations of the exclusions
(Young, 2014). Also, non-GAAP earnings reports that are included in unaudited
documents are less regulated and companies are not required to including definition,
reconciliation, and explanations for non-GAAP adjustments in these reports (Black, 2018)
 Additional regulations
As the effect of regulations G on non-GAAP reporting practices deteriorated, the
happening the financial crisis (2008) has given more pressure on regulators for more
transparent and accurate financial reporting practices and additional regulations,
particularly on non-GAAP reporting. In response to the demand of the equity market for
better financial reports, SEC used a Compliance and Disclosure Interpretation on
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regulations of non-GAAP financial measures in 2010 (Later on updated in 2011). The
additional regulations emphasize the content of reg. G but with the requirements for stricter
application and scrutiny from SEC’s side. In addition, a taskforce was formed in July 2013
to examine and supervise companies’ non-GAAP earnings reports (Rapoport, 2013). The
team’s goal is to ensure the consistency and accuracy of non-GAAP disclosures (Deloitte,
2011). Black’s study (2017) attempted to measure the aggressiveness of managers after
these new regulations and found that managers’ aggressiveness reduced right after the
release of both Reg G. and new regulations. The level of aggressiveness, however, always
bounced back after a while (Black, 2017)
A call for a more extensive role of auditors
In addition to stricter regulations regarding non-GAAP financial reporting, SEC also called
for a more extensive and active role of auditors in supervising and scrutinizing the use of
non-GAAP earnings metrics. Traditionally, auditors play a more passive role in non-
GAAP reporting (Black, 2018). Often, they routinely follow and examine non-GAAP
relating announcements and reports; and formally verify reconciliations but do not actively
opine on the information. A more active involvement of auditors, hence, will assumedly
help to ensure the quality of non-GAAP earnings metrics.
2.7. Hypothesis development
The reporting of non-GAAP financial numbers has become popular since 1990s. Up till
2003, the reporting of these street numbers has become more aggressive with both higher
frequency and larger adjustments. However, noticing the opportunistic behaviors from
companies’ managers, market regulators intervened by publishing regulation G. Although
non-GAAP metrics decreased drastically after Reg G in 2003 (Heflin, 2005 and Black
2018), the impact of reg G seems to be temporary. The frequency of non-GAAP reporting
bounced back since 2004 (Black, 2018 and Bentley, 2018). Not only the frequency, but
also the magnitude of exclusions has also been inflated since 1990s. There are two main
reasons why managers publish non-GAAP numbers, whether to improve performance
perception (Opportunistic behavior) or to better communicate with investors about core
performance (Helfin, 2008). However, through out literature about GAAP and non-GAAP
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financial metrics, the non-GAAP metrics are almost always higher than GAAP metrics that
seems to indicate managers’ opportunistic behaviors of misleading the market participants.
Therefore, our first null hypothesis is as follow:
H1: The frequency of non-GAAP financial metrics reporting as well as the magnitude of
exclusion increased largely in period of 2003 to 2016.
The second hypothesis is about the driving factors of differences (exclusions) between
GAAP and non-GAAP metrics. As there is no mutual definitions of non-GAAP
adjustments and methods, types of adjustment in non-GAAP reporting varies largely across
sections. It is reported that managers tend to exclude non-cash and non-recurring items to
arrive to non-GAAP numbers. Especially, items such as stock-based compensation,
goodwill, write-down, merge and acquisition cost and research and development
expenditures are the most common adjustments in non-GAAP reporting (Sloan and
Bradshaw, 2001). Kovel (2008) reported that the quality of adjustment has increased, and
managers are more cautious in adjusting financial numbers (Heflin and Hsu, 2995).
Contrarily, the use of special items, particularly stock-compensation, interest and tax
become more popular in non-GAAP adjustment (Doyle, 2013; Kovel, 2008; Black, 2017).
Hence, the effect of Reg G after 2003 has deteriorated and companies simply find new
method to adjust their earnings.
Marques (2006) and Entwistle et al. (2006) find declines in the frequency of non-GAAP
earnings disclosures and in exclusion magnitudes, but an increase in special-item
exclusions.





Often I/B/E/S earnings per share is used as a proxy for managers’ non-GAAP due to the
lack of an extensive sample of direct managers’ earnings metrics. I/B/E/S metrics, or in the
other words, analysts’ non-GAAP metrics agree largely to manager’s non-GAAP metrics
and often are informative in many contexts. However, as discussed in literature review,
usage of I/B/E/S as proxy for manager’s pro forma metrics can be misleading and biased.
Bently et al. (2018) explains that using I/B/E/S as proxy for manager’s non-GAAP will
understate managers’ aggressiveness in non-GAAP reporting. Therefore, in order to
examine the development of managers’ non-GAAP earnings metrics in term of frequency
and magnitude, we will use the data set from Bently et al.’s study (2018).
The data set is the first publicly available and the most extensive data set of managers’
non-GAAP earning. Bently et al. (2018) programmatically searched and extracted
managers’ non-GAAP Earning Per Share (EPS) from quarterly earnings announcements in
SEC 8-K filings. The data set consists of 115,370 observations from 2003 to 2012. We use
earning per share metric (EPS) to present companies’ earnings performance. EPS is
calculated as a company’s net profit divided by the number of common outstanding shares.
EPS is an indicator of company’s performance as it indicates investors’ perception of
company’s fundamental performance (Wikipedia).
In order to calculate non-GAAP adjustments between managers’ non-GAAP financial
metrics and GAAP financial metrics, we collect GAAP EPS data from. We begin with all
consolidated companies with quarterly EPS report with fiscal year ending from 2003 till
2016. The time period is decided largely by the availability of non- GAAP EPS data
provided in Bently’s database. As mentioned in Bently’s study the key reason for the time
period is that, it became mandatory for firms to publish the filing of 8-Ks for earnings with
the implementation of Regulation G in 2003 (Bently et al., 2018).
While combining non-GAAP EPS and GAAP EPS, we eliminate all the companies that do
not publish a non-GAAP_EPS metrics to make it comparable. Also, we also exclude all
real estate investment funds because these companies are required to report industry-
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specific and standard earning announcement (Bently et al., 2018). This process yields in a
total of 49918 observations of non-GAAP metrics for period from 2003 to 2016. Out of
these 49919 observations, 15 observations do not have GAAP_EPS metrics. Hence, our
final sample size for the first hypothesis is 49904 observations that have both GAAP EPS
and non_GAAP EPS. The non-GAAP adjustment is calculated as non-GAAP EPS
subtracted from GAAP.
For the second hypothesis, in order to identify the key drivers of the exclusions in non-
GAAP financial metrics, we identify some income statement items that are likely to
correlate to the exclusions as in table 1. As discussed in literature review, managers tend to
use transitory and non-recurring expenses. Cost of goods sold item are included because
it’s often one of the largest expenses in balance sheet. COGS are often recurring, so we do
not expect a high correlation with non-GAAP exclusions. Selling and general
administration expenses can consist of non-recurring, so there might be a relation with
non-GAAP exclusions. As depreciation and amortization expenses is one of the most
common types of adjustments in non-GAAP earnings, we also expect a positive correlation
between depreciation and amortization line item and exclusions. Since there have been
some observations that managers can exclude items like taxes on stock options, deferred
compensations, etc. income tax is examined as well. Special items and others consist of
common non-GAAP adjustments such as restructuring cost, good will amortization, write-
downs, etc. Hence, we expect that special items or others might be the driving force of
non-GAAP exclusions. All the variables are deflated by the by the beginning-of-period
market value of equity.
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Variables Measurement of the data
EPS_GAAP Earnings per share, excluding extraordinary items
EPS_non_GAAP Earnings per share, non-GAAP
Exclusions (EPS_GAAP) – (EPS_non_GAAP)
COGS Cost of goods sold / market value of equity
SGA Selling, general and administrative expenses/ market value of
equity
DEP Depreciation and amortization/ market value of equity
TAX Income taxes/ market value of equity
SPI Special items/ market value of equity*
Others Sales minus income before extraordinary items minus other
components (COGS, SGA, DEP, TAX, SPI)
      Market value of equity = PRCC_F * CSHO (stock price end of fiscal year * number of shares
outstanding)
Table 1: Variables definition and measurement
3.1.2. Model
In order the test whether the exclusions in non_GAAP metrics are associated with income
statement components (H2), we use the following logistic regression model:
Exclusions = α₀ + α₁COGS + α₂SGA + α₃DP + α₄TAX + α₅SPI + α₆Others + ε
This model is based Denelson et al.’s decomposition framework (Denelson et al. 2001 and
Jarva et al., 2019). As discussed in literature review, managers tend to make more
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adjustments to non-cash and non-recurring items in their pro forma reporting, we divide
income state items into six components which are more likely to have different level of
influence on exclusions. Hence, the independent variables consist of COGS (cost of goods
sold), SGA (Selling, general administrative expense), DEP (depreciation and
amortization), TAX (income taxes), SPI (special items) and Others (Other components in
income statement calculated all together). All independent variables are scaled by market
value of equity to guarantee comparability. The dependent variable is exclusion which is
calculated by subtracting non_GAAP_EPS from GAAP_EPS.
The independent variables are likely to associate with exclusions when they have a positive
coefficient across the data set.  Before Reg G, items such as stock-based compensation,
good will, write-down, merger and acquisition and R&D expenditures are popular. After
Reg G (2003), managers have adjusted the method of producing non-GAAP metrics
numbers. They are more likely to use special items, interest, and tax (Doyle, 2013; Kovel,
2008; Black, 2017). Therefore, we expect a positive coefficient particularly in tax,

















2003 0.149 0.802 0.247 0.527 -0.098 0.558
2004 0.189 0.902 0.287 0.550 -0.098 0.660
2005 0.205 0.984 0.301 0.619 -0.100 0.704
2006 0.237 0.942 0.330 0.619 -0.094 0.674
2007 0.241 1.027 0.349 0.629 -0.109 0.770
2008 0.138 1.440 0.340 0.733 -0.203 1.220
2009 0.125 1.424 0.336 0.714 -0.211 1.212
2010 0.151 1.360 0.347 0.693 -0.196 1.151
2011 0.172 1.318 0.359 0.695 -0.187 1.106
2012 0.190 1.287 0.374 0.692 -0.184 1.071
2013 0.211 1.258 0.389 0.696 -0.179 1.033
2014 0.228 1.241 0.406 0.712 -0.178 1.006
2015 0.222 1.342 0.419 0.732 -0.197 1.112
2016 0.221 1.347 0.421 0.739 -0.199 1.110
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows the mean and standard deviation of GAAP_EPS, non_GAAP_EPS and
exclusions for the period from 2003 to 2016.
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4.1.1. Frequency of non-GAAP reporting
Frequency of non_GAAP reports from 2003-2015
Chart 1: Frequency of non-GAAP reporting (2003-2016)
As the time of gathering data, the fiscal year of 2016 was not closed yet, so we excluded
the data for 2016. Chart 1 shows the development of non-GAAP reporting in term of
quantity from 2003 until 2015. According to previous literature, there was a drop in the
amount of non_GAAP reports immediately after reg G. However, there has been a clear
surge in the amount of non-GAAP report since 2004 onwards, one year after the regulation
G was issued. Especially during the period of 2003-2004, after the reg G came into effect,
we can see a halt in non-GAAP reporting. However, after 2004, the amount of non-GAAP
reports has gradually grown showing that the effect of reg G has deteriorated soon after it
was released. This proves that the effect of regulation G was temporary. Similarly, the
additional regulations imposed by SEC in 2009-2010 also caused a subtle drop on the
amount of non-GAAP reports before it recovered and gradually increased again.
On the period from 2004 until 2015 the amount of non-GAAP reports has doubled. This
growth in non-GAAP reporting can be seen as the response for the increasing demand for
more information in the market. As managers have better insights of their companies,
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providing non_GAAP metrics can be seen as managers’ effort to provide more accurate
picture of their company performance. On the other hand, it has been challenging to prove
whether managers publish their non-GAAP measures for opportunistic reasons or not, and
the purpose of reg G is to prevent such behaviors. The sudden drop in the amount of
non_GAAP reports can be interpreted as that the publishing of non-GAAP metrics is partly
driven by managers’ opportunistic behaviors. After the reg G managers have adjusted their
methods in non_GAAP reporting so that they can still manipulate earning numbers and
provide a more favorable picture.
In short, after reg G the amount of non-GAAP reports have increased gradually and, hence
has the tendency to increase in the future if there is no further intervention from market
regulators. As market are in need for more information, companies naturally want to
publish their non-GAAP metrics to provide the market participants with more accurate
information. However, since there is not much regulation on non-GAAP numbers, market
participants should be aware that managers can use non-GAAP numbers to create a more
favorable picture about companies’ performances.
4.1.2. Magnitude of non-GAAP exclusions
Chart 2: Mean value over time of GAAP_EPS, non_GAAP_EPS and Exclusions
(2003-2016)
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The first noticable thing from chart 2 is the value of non_GAAP_EPS has been always
higher than GAAP_EPS. This agrees largely with observations from previous literature and
it also raises the questions about managers’ opportunistic behaviors in producing
non_GAAP_EPS.
Chart 2 shows that the value of GAAP_EPS have changed over time according to the
economic cycle with a sudden drop after the financial crisis in 2008 and its gradual recover
afterwards. However, the non_GAAP_EPS data shows a slightly different story. Although
the value of non_GAAP_EPS has, to the large extent, followed the development of the
GAAP_EPS, the effect of 2008 finanical crisis is rather modest in non_GAAP_EPS value.
The mean value of GAAP_EPS dropped 43% meanwhile non_GAAP_EPS shows a
modest 2.6% drop in value in the period of 2007-2008. Also, after the drop the value of
both GAAP_EPS remains at lower level than before the financial crisis and slightly went
up as the economy slowly recover. By 2016 the value of GAAP_EPS was only 0.221
which is only 48% higher than the EPS level of 2013. However, the non_GAAP_EPS level
kept growing and peeked at the highest level at 0.421 in 2016, 70% higher than than the
level of 2013.
The trend in exclusions naturally follow the same patterns. Before the finanical crisis in
2008, the difference between GAAP_EPS and non_GAAP_EPS had been around 0.1.
However, after 2008, the mean value of exclusions surged up to even 100%. It shows that
managers got more aggressive in their exclusion in their non-GAAP reporting, especially
during crisis period. Also right after the crisis, the exclusion value remained at the high
level of about -0.2. There are two possible explainations for this trend. Firstly, after the
financial crisis, the finanical performance of companies became and complicated and the
standardized GAAP is no longer able to grasp the full picture of companies’ performance,
leading to a bigger gap between GAAP and non_GAAP performance. Secondly, after the
financial crisis, investors are more sceptical and more sensitive to negative financial
results, giving incentives to managers to manipulate their companies’ finanical
performance numbers. Also, since there have been no major interventions from market
regulators, managers have adjusted their methods to exclude factors that negativesly affects
companies’s pictures and become more aggressive in trying to give a favorable picture of
their companies’ financial performance.
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Chart 3: Standard deviation over time of GAAP_EPS, non_GAAP_EPS and exclusions
As the mean value of GAAP_EPS, non_GAAP_EPS and exclusions, their standard
deviation values also increase over time, particularly after the 2008 financial crisis. The
data spread more widely and seems to have more outliers after 2008.
Also, in order to emperically test the H1, we run a regression for curve fitting in order to
see whether the increase in the scope of non-GAAP exclusions are sporatic and random or
there is actually a development trend.
Exclusions= a0 + a1*t + e
 with independent variable t representing time series of the development. We assign year









df SS MS F p-value sig
Regression 1 0.017 0.017 18.96 0,0009 no
Residual 12 0.011 0.000
Total 13 0.028
coeff std err t stat p-value
Intercept -0.093 0.017 -5.417 0.0002
Year -0.008 0.002 -4.354 0.0009
Table 3: Summary of liner regression
Table 3 show that variable t has p-value of (0.0009) < (0.05) which is statistically
significant. This means that there is an increasing trend in the magnitude of non-GAAP
exclusions for the period from 2003 to 2016 that supports H1.
4.2. Analysis of non-GAAP exclusions
Descriptive statistics (N=23075)
Mean      Std.        Median
COGS 0.200      0.280        0.100
DP 0.010      0.020        0.010
SGA 0.070      0.070        0.040
TAX 0.010      0.020        0.010
SPI -0.010      0.050        0.008
Others 0.030      0.110        0.009
Exclusions 0.180      0.440       -0.090
GAAP_EPS 0.270      0.730        0.210
Non_GAAP_EPS 0.450      0.620        0.330
Table 4: Descriptive statistics
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Table 3 summarize descriptive statistics of both dependent and independent variables of
the regression. Among the independent variables, COGS is the largest expense item with
the mean value of 0.2, followed by Selling, general and administrative expenses; and
others (Mean values are 0.07 and 0.03, respectively). The smallest expense items are
Depreciation, Tax and Special items (Mean values are 0.01, 0.01 and -0,01). Although
COGS is the biggest expense in income statement, the cost item is reoccurring one, hence,
according to literature, managers are less likely to adjust this line item in their non-GAAP
reporting. On the other hand, Depreciation, Tax, special items and other items, despite of
their small in scope, are more likely to relate the exclusions in managers’ non-GAAP
reporting.
Summary statistics of multiple regression
Coeff T-stat P-value Lower Upper
Intercept -0.151 -40.761 0.000 -0.158 -0.143
COGS 0.028 2.694 0.007 0.007 0.048
DP -0.235 -1.789 0.073 -0.493 0.022
SGA 0.404 9.457 0.000 0.320 0.488
TAX -0.417 -2.591 0.009 -0.733 -0.101
SPI 1.395 6.704 0.000 0.987 1.803
Others -1.569 -15.551 0.000 -1.766 -1.371
Multiple R 0.513
R Square 0.263
Adjusted R Square 0.263
Standard Error 0.380
Table 5: Summary statistics of multiple regression
Table 5 shows the result of multiple regression. Firstly, the finding indicates that, among
the dependent variables, special items are strongly related to non-GAAP exclusions. A
coefficient of 1.39 indicates a stronger than normal link between SPI and non-GAAP
exclusion. As discussed in literature review, after the regulation G. was issued, managers
have excluded non-recurring expenses, especially from special items, worsening the
earnings quality of special items. This highly agrees with our hypothesis 2: “H2: Special
items are the main drivers of the gap between GAAP and non-GAAP metrics.”. Secondly,
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the Selling, general and administrative expense line time also have strong link to the
exclusions, with the coefficient of 0.40. Also, we find an unexpected link between COGS
and exclusions with coefficient of 0.02. According Ettredge et al. (2010), misreports in
cost of goods sold, and selling, general, and administrative expenses, are highly linked to
earning manipulation. As companies ran out of opportunities to make exclusions in normal
areas of non-GAAP reporting, they are more likely to commit in earning manipulation by
making exclusions in cost of goods sold and selling, general, and administrative expenses.
(Rong and How, 2018). The strong link found in COGS and SGA in this study supports
this theory largely. Finally, Others, Tax, and Depreciation line items have negative
coefficient with exclusions with coefficient values of -1.57, -0.42, and - 0.23. This
indicates that managers are moving away from their traditional types of exclusions such as
tax item and depreciation and amortization item to new types of exclusions such as special
items and other less conventional items like COGS and SGA.
The regression model explains about 26.4% of the variation in non-GAAP exclusion. On
one hand, this means mean that line items in income statement do relate to non-GAAP





This thesis firstly aims to examine the development of non-GAAP earnings reports for the
period from 2003 to 2012 in term of frequency and magnitude. By collecting and analyzing
the non-GAAP earnings per share for this period, we find that the number of non-GAAP
reports have increased drastically from 2003 until 2012. Although the quantity of non-
GAAP earnings metrics reduces slightly after the issuance of Regulation (2003) and
additional regulations (2010), the amount of non-GAAP earnings has always bounced back
and continuously increased. This phenomenon can be interpreted that the demand for more
accurate financial information has gradually increased and the increasing numbers of non-
GAAP reports is simply response to this demand. Because managers have better
understanding to companies’ performance, managers’ non-GAAP reports have value
implication in equity valuation. On the other hand, the increasing number of non-GAAP
reports can be the result of managers’ effort to manipulatively influence investors’
perception of companies’ financial performance.
Secondly, we examined the magnitude and quality of non-GAAP reports by measuring
non-GAAP exclusions. Not only non-GAAP exclusions have increase in its scope in the
period from 2003 till 2012, but also the gap soared significantly in crisis time. Although
GAAP EPS and non-GAAP EPS agree to the large extend, GAAP EPS moved largely
according to economic cycle dropping drastically during crisis time while non-GAAP EPS
remained high and was less affected by the financial crisis (2008). This indicates that
managers become more aggressive in their non-GAAP reporting during crisis time. It is,
however, challenging to distinguish manager’s intention of providing accurate financial
metrics with their opportunistic behaviors.
Lastly, special items are highly correlated to non-GAAP exclusions. Originally, special
items are considered high-quality exclusions. However, after the regulation G, managers
found new methods to shift recurring items into special items since definition of special
items are subjective. As special items have higher power of predictability of company’s
future performance, removing special items can be misleading and flawed. A strong link
between special items and non-GAAP exclusions somewhat suggests possible
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opportunistic behaviors of managers. In short, Special items is the key driver behind the
difference between GAAP and non-GAAP EPS. Additionally, Selling and general
administrative expenses and cost of goods sold are also found positively correlate to non-
GAAP exclusions. One of the possible explanations for this finding is that as managers
exhaust in the exclusion common in other common areas, managers resort to other
exclusions in order to enhance the earnings results. This choice of exclusions strongly
indicates possibility of earnings manipulation (Ettredge, 2010). Particularly in selling and
general administrative expenses, there are many non-cash and non-recurring expenses can
be recorded, making it more likely to be excluded in non-GAAP reporting.
Others item and have negative correlation with non-GAAP exclusions, meaning that
managers are not likely to exclude these items in their non-GAAP reporting. Tax and
Depreciation item also have negative correlation with non-GAAP exclusions, which do not
agree with previous literature. According to previous literature, as depreciation and
amortization expenses are often non-cash and non-transitory, there have been various
evidence that managers often make exclusion in this line items in their non-GAAP
reporting. Exclusions on tax items are less common in non-GAAP reporting, so it explains
the negative relation between tax items and exclusions.
5.2. Practical implications
The study shows the increase in popularity of non-GAAP and the increasing level of
aggressiveness of managers in their-non-GAAP reporting. Also, the methods of exclusions
have evolved largely for the last three decades. Although there have been regulation G. and
other additional level, the effect of these regulations deteriorated right after the issuances
of these regulation. This, therefore, calls for more extensive regulation enforcements on
non-GAAP reporting. And there is a need for a continuous monitoring and supervision so
that non-GAAP earnings report serves its purpose of providing complementing information
for equity evaluation.
This study also can be used as a warning on quality non-GAAP earnings reports and as an
instruction how non-GAAP reports should be utilized. This study also helps market
participants to be more aware of the shortfalls of non-GAAP earnings metrics and the
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possibility of earnings manipulation in non-GAAP earnings reporting. As the methods and
the choices of exclusions have evolved quickly and to a complex level, analysts and
investors should not only pay attention to traditional non-recurring exclusions such as other
items, compensations, depreciation and amortization, etc. but also to other alternatives like
special items, cost of goods sold and selling and general administration expenses.
5.3. Limitations of the study and suggestions for further study
Even though we see exclusions of which income statement items have stronger effects on
non-GAAP earnings numbers, we still cannot disentangle the managers’ motives of
whether to provide more accurate financial numbers or to manipulate the earnings. Hence,
further studies on this topic can help to give a clearer picture on how non-GAAP earnings
metrics should be used in the context of equity valuation. As the regression model and the
choice of independent variables only explain a minor part of the non-GAAP exclusions,
this means that there are many other possible factors that explains the development of the
non-GAAP exclusions. Hence, further study needs to be done on these topics.
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APPENDIX A
Industry classification of Fama and French (1997)
Aircraft
Agriculture
Automobiles and trucsk
Banking
Alcoholic beverages
Construction materials
Printing and publishing
Shipping containers
Business services
Chemicals
Electronic equipment
Apparel
Construction
Coal
Computers
Pharmaceutical products
Electrical equipment
Petroleum and natural
gas
Fabricated products
Trading
Food products
Entertainment
Precious metals
Defense
Healthcare
Consumer goods
Insurance
Measuring and control
equip
Machinery
Restaurants, hotel, motel
Medical equipment
Nonmetallic mining
Miscellaneous
Business supplies
Personal services
Real estate
Retail
Rubber and plastic
products
Shipbuilding, railroad eq
Tobacco products
Candy and soda
Steel works, Etc.
Telecommunications
Recreational products
Transportations
Textiles
Utilities
Wholesale
